

PAUL FRIEDRICH
University of Chicago

Language, Ideology, and Political Economy

After sharply defining and contrasting an "analytic-scientific" and an "emotional-ethical" approach and their interrelations, this article goes on to explore some possible interconnections among the three main phenomena, before discussing each in more detail. The first is political economy in several important senses; germane problems are noted that deal with (ethno)quantification and the innovative individual. The second phenomenon is ideology, in three senses: (1) notional ideology, (2) ideology for maintaining or changing a sociopolitical order, and (3) ideology for masking a structure of domination. The third phenomenon is language, again in various senses, but particularly as (1) a symbolism with a structure analogous in some ways to that of economics, and (2) a mediator between ideology and political economy; considerable attention is given to the political-economic functions of language figures such as irony and synecdoche. A fourth, analytically crucial kind of ideology, "linguacultural ideology," fills in the foregoing structure. Alternative logics, alternative combinations of variables, and alternative complementary theories are suggested throughout, particularly in the final section.

The end of a theory is to carry one thread of consciousness through different states of consciousness.

—C. S. Peirce, "Notes on Positivism"

I WANT TO REFORMULATE A POINT OF VIEW THAT IS RADICAL in a generic sense (e.g., relevant, critical), and I believe that one way to do this is to develop and interweave two established and partly intersecting approaches, including their methods and motivations.

The first is concerned with economic and other cultural values and relations, and with relations between relations as a kind of value. It is rational, intellectual, and cognitive, and focuses on constructing rigorous scientific models and empirical, operational, or at least the insight-yielding methods to go with them. It is rooted in analysis and, ultimately, the drive to know and understand. Let's call it the analytic-scientific approach.

The second approach is more concerned with the emotions, motivation, and issues of right and wrong—often with exploitation and oppression, the domination of one individual, class, or national polity over another, as in the case of colonialism. Social justice and individual liberation loom large, and the student may be driven by a sense of social criticism, even outrage. In other cases, however, the focus is on societies that are relatively classless and minimally exploitative. In either case, the approach is rooted in identification and affinity with one's fellow human, and could be called emotional-ethical.¹

Much research today deals with such things as systems of economic values, linguistically coded political relations, and sets of economy and sets of power. Yet such research also implies and sometimes openly expresses criticism or outrage at hegemonies, the dominance of (certain) ideologies, and the consequences of exploitation and oppression (e.g., colonialism). This same combination of analysis and criticism is found in Thoreau's *Wal-*

PAUL FRIEDRICH is Professor, Departments of Anthropology and Linguistics, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL 60637.

den, where a social and ethical critique is synthesized with bean-patch and small-farmer economics. The combination is expressed much more strongly in Karl Marx's *Capital*, which is focused about equally, I am convinced, in the analytical brilliance of chapter 1, notably in the section, "The Fetishism of Commodities," and in the open moral fury and supporting statistics and quotations of chapter 10, "The Working Day" (mainly about child laborers in English industry).

Children of nine or ten are dragged from their squalid beds at two, three, and four o'clock in the morning and compelled to work for a bare subsistence until ten, eleven, or twelve at night, their limbs wearing away, their frames dwindling, their faces whitening, and their humanity sinking into a stone-like torpor, utterly horrible to contemplate. [1976(1867):268]

Identical utterances would hold today for child labor in India, Africa, and Latin America; for that matter, more than 2,300 children and adolescents were hospitalized for farm labor accidents in the United States in 1987.

The emotional-ethical approach and the analytical-scientific one *may* exclude each other, and neither is reducible to the other. But most of the time the two approaches are essential to each other, for both are "critical" and concerned with "values," although the meanings of these terms differ greatly in context: a scientific criticism is always implicitly ethical to a significant degree, and an ethical criticism is almost always scientific to some extent. In other words, the scientific approach is primarily rooted in the cognitive (e.g., the logic of experiment) and is concerned with diverse levels of knowledge, and the ethical-emotive is rooted in the affective as well as being overtly focused on such phenomena, but it is also commonplace for a cognitive analysis to arise from an ethical concern, and for an analysis of affect to arise from the *libido cognoscendi* (the drive to know). These complex interdependencies are always a relative matter. Barring the extreme of certain professional economists—who seem a-ethical—or the poets innocent of economic analysis, most radical theory will exhibit both approaches, and the interstitial cases are particularly illuminating; here I am thinking, for example, of a poetic and economically aware leader such as the regional Mexican agrarian revolutionary Primo Tapia (P. Friedrich 1977 [1970]).

In considering the ethical-emotional and scientific-analytical and other categories, I will be drawing throughout on a welter of what biologists call *nomina confusa* (overlapping terms, polysemy, and so forth), and, beyond that, on a multitude of names, schools, polemics, and finely honed distinctions, some from earlier work done "east of the Rhine," so to speak, but a great deal from French and English academics publishing during the last two decades. My own use of "critical," for example, is far from being synonymous with "humanist" or "philosophical." The many terms and ideas dealt with below would, if treated with bibliographical and intellectual-historical explicitness, lead to a huge book bristling with references and footnotes. What follows, on the contrary, is a condensed synthesis intended for scholars in cultural linguistics, philosophical anthropology, and the like, who are asked to welcome the guidelines but also to do some work in matching text and (appended) bibliography. Similarly, this article breaks with established journal practice in not being interwoven with or at least wrapped around a case, although drawing heavily on empirical studies. This essay is an argued structure of ideas and should be read as such.

To return to our major question: How are we to integrate the ethical-emotional and the scientific-analytical approaches just as, in other contexts, we ask: How do we integrate theory and practice? Or rather, since we recognize that theory and practice cannot be segregated from each other in any valid way, we see that the analytic-scientific and emotional-ethical approaches also cannot be segregated. The question then becomes: How are we to perceive and articulate their conjunction and, indeed, the conjunction of both approaches and theory/practice? More specifically, which of the nine possible relations among our three variables (counting both reciprocal and one-way determination) have figured in the theoretical literature or are at least potentially fruitful? How do our variables interdepend? Let's open up the entire question of the direction of interdepend-

dencies among language, ideology, and political economy. Let's also, at another level, narrow it down by asking, for example, how "language" in our several senses and ideology (whether tactical or interpretive) interdepend in partly constituting the criteria for the political economy.

Interdependencies

Everything is *vermittelt*-mediated, bound into one, connected by transitions. . . . Not only the unity of opposites, but the transition of every determination, quality, feature, side, property into every other. . . . For Hegel, action, practice, is a logical "syllogism," a figure of logic. And that is true!

—V. I. Lenin, *Conspectus of Hegel's Book "The Science of Logic"*

There are many possibilities. In fact, since each of our components—political economy, ideology, and language—has multiple levels and subvariables, and since determination and causation can work either way in given instances and contexts, and are always recursive in principle, the total number of causal schemes is not only large but practically infinite. And we know that these causes and dimensions and their interrelations are the mutually implicative, interdependent parts of a larger whole. Indeed, the general idea of working and thinking in terms of a whole system-in-process is the most valuable of all, whether or not we make ancillary assumptions—often gratuitous—about harmony, homogeneity, boundedness, or regularity. This spinozistic truth—which so inspires Lenin in the quote above—is important and interesting, but leaves us with a residual problem of how the parts are related to each other and which relations are more revealing and how any relations are related to the apocalyptically envisioned totality and the always-potential imperfections in that eventual totality. For example, it is true that economic determinism is always partly a matter of consciousness and that consciousness is always partly economic, but just how does this work out in actual social contexts, cultural idea systems, and history? Or, to take another issue, the study of political economy has often been rooted in such values as the universal franchise, democracy in some sense, economic rights for all, and a humanely planned economy (vs. neoclassical political economics and its "freedom of competition"), but how have those laudable values been structured by the language and ideology of the scholars in question?

Once we descend from the value of the whole and the plethora of possible combinations, there seem to be at least four salient directions of determination that have been illustrated and established by major theorists. First, political economy may determine ideology, which then determines language—although there is much feedback and counter-determination among all three. Second, political economy can be seen as largely determining the complexes of language and ideology, which completely interpenetrate each other (e.g., Lukács 1985). Third, the main problem may be how the language mediates between ideology and political economy (K. Mannheim 1953). Fourth, language may be completely interwoven with political economy, specifically with the economic and technological—most powerfully so because least obviously and most insidiously so. From this complex synthesis, where the techno-economic is always linguistic, and the linguistic is always techno-economic, ideology emerges as a primary output—perhaps *the* primary output—governing human acts and attitudes. In yet another variant, the political economy (at least implicitly) determines classes, and conflict between classes goes on within a language context (Voloshinov 1973).

There are other possibilities. For example, weak models dichotomize the universe into two levels, one of them dominant. In the case of our variables, if ideology is dominant, we get categorical idealism, mysticism, or a Marxism in which ideology has gotten the upper hand (as in Voloshinov at times); if political economy is dominant, we get Marxist fundamentalism (as in Stalin), or some varieties of classical economics; if language is dominant, we get linguistic determinism (e.g., the early Wittgenstein, or Whorf and the

categorical Whorfians). Such two-level models are not only shallow in a logical and real-world sense, but are counter-intuitively constraining.

Having reviewed some interdependencies, and suggested some of the possibilities and some of the complexities, let us turn to the first of the three variables.

Political Economy

Homer, Theocritus disdaining,
From Adam Smith he sought his training
And was no mean economist. . . .

—Alexander Pushkin, *Eugene Onegin*

“Political economy” is the vaguest and currently the most fashionable of our three variables. What does it mean?

Political economy involves resource allocation in the sense, for example, of control over goods. Political economy involves the generic economic processes of the production, distribution, and consumption of goods, including “non-material” ones, and the patterns and culture of power that control or influence these processes. While such a definition may sound hackneyed, it can lead to non-hackneyed questions when, for example, we interrelate the use of pesticides and the ideology of local factions and the poetry in the language of harvesting. Political economy thus involves the following sorts of questions, in a tradition of inquiry that runs from Adam Smith to C. W. Mills: Do the pursuit of economic self-interest and the welfare of the public mutually imply each other, or must they lead to periodic economic crises—which always have linguistic repercussions (as when the ruin of a plantation aristocracy affects the prestigiousness of many key words)? To what extent is the elite with the most political power also the economic elite? Or is there any nonsymbolic capital, as the proponents of “symbolic capital” suggest (Bourdieu 1985:171–183)? Obviously not: all capital and labor, like all hegemony and exploitation, are symbolic because all human activity is conceived, imagined, and carried out in and amidst symbolic units and relations. There is also no nonsymbolic or presymbolic play among children. But this having been said, we are left with the question of *how* they are symbolic and to what degree. How, for example, do patterns of cooperation and conflict among classes, castes, elites, or political factions in one village or region or ghetto or nation connect or associate in some causally significant way with such linguistic phenomena as phonemic variation or change (Labov 1972; B. Mannheim 1989), indirect discourse (Voloshinov 1973:125–161), or pronominal usage (Errington 1985; Luong 1988; Paulston 1984)? Much of the symbolism involves interfacing with other variables, since all political economic phenomena, such as male hunting organization or the female control of childbirthing, have essential linguistic and ideological aspects (e.g., the negative relation of women to wild animal blood and of men to blood of the womb). To paraphrase Peirce, all these variables are complex symbols in that any one is in part an aspect of the other. Some of the answers lie in the (socio)linguistic code, and some lie in the actual, on-the-ground processes of political caucuses, dyadic conversations, and the like.

After the general review above I want to conclude this part of the article with two propositions that I hope will be constructively provocative. My first proposition is that political economy saliently includes quantifiable matters. Historical change, including linguistic change, often involves quantitative build-ups or decay followed by sudden, qualitative leaps and systematic realignments and reorientations. This has been demonstrated—no matter what your stand is on Hegelian-Marxist logic or neo-Bloomfieldian sociolinguistics. “Quantification” may refer to such things as the number of liters of white maize or pounds of black bread a worker needs per week, and the price of these things in the marketplace. Such quantities actually obsess many of the primitives and peasants whom we study; their conversations are often replete with prices and measurements. Such quantities are integral, not only to ethnography (e.g., P. Friedrich 1987; Nash 1985)

but to the poetry of the culture in question, just as world economics is integral to the *Canto General* of Neruda.

Ethnoeconomics or ethnographic microeconomics, or whatever label you prefer, refers here to empirical, feasible methods and to well-known publications (Tax 1953; Firth 1975). Maize-roots quantification, then, can be studied fruitfully, inter alia, by our usual anthropological approaches to the individual and the family, and through local terms, measures, and concerns, whether or not these are seen as culturally interpreted, or as part of a national political economy or the world economic system (in which practically all families are now entangled). Maize-root economics, in other words, can be understood in terms of native categories and counts, and by an external, positivistic economics, without our having to follow Samuelson (1985) and others in making quantification *the* criterion for truthful analysis. A vital objective for the sociolinguistics and the econolinguistics of the future is to push beyond social variables to their economic sources and associations, to take reasonable account of the economist's economics (and the political scientist's politics), to deal explicitly rather than allusively in both theoretical arguments and descriptive monographs. In the same spirit of the pricelessness of facts, let's eschew the quality-without-quantity of so much sociolinguistic, symbolic, and interpretive anthropology (granted major exceptions, such as Victor Turner).

My second proposition concerns the active, inventive individual. The "individual" may be modal or archetypal: "headman," "thief," or landless peon (who should in principle be equally interesting). "Individual" also includes unique, active individuals such as the leader Pedro Martínez and his anthropologist Oscar Lewis. This "unique, actual" individual, incidentally, is methodologically and epistemologically coordinate with the (equally unique) village, tribe, local language, and local history, and other standard objects of anthropological and anthropological linguistic inquiry. Individuals at these and yet other levels should be included because they give critical margins of understanding, insight, and intuition into "how the political economy works" and how it is lived out in real life (e.g., Mintz 1974)—margins that elude the rigidly sociocentric or socioeconocentric modes of research. When the biographical and autobiographical dimensions are not dealt with, the study of language (particularly of tropes and style) and of political economy (particularly of leadership and innovation) tends to remain somehow unreal, and hence vulnerable to the charge of objectification and even of structuralist fetishization and alienation. The categorical exclusion of the unique individual in dogmatically sociocentric models is often motivated by a spurious scientism, spurious because the unique native—the anthropologist's equal—is in no way analogous to (a history of) a unique atom or cell or fish or stone in the natural sciences; to exclude the unique individual as a matter of methodological principle is disturbingly analogous to the suppression of dissent in a totalitarian society. Also, ideologies, like poems, are always originally generated and contributed to by individuals. Among the exemplary ethnographies of speaking, very few address themselves to how a (hypothetical) individual actually could put the system together (for an exception see Beeman 1986).

The idea of political economy can be generalized by relating it to another idea with which it often overlaps in anthropology and sociolinguistics: that of culture. Culture may be seen as the world view of the natives as set forth in unmonitored texts, or as inferred from without but projected to within by the scientist (e.g., Redfield 1955:91), or as a historically structured set of patterns, values, attitudes, and sentiments—explicit and implicit, rational and irrational, conscious and unconscious—that are continually (re)created by the individuals of a society (Kluckhohn and Kelley 1945). In these and yet other, less familiar definitions, "culture" would, from a political economic angle, be characterized with a relative emphasis on political factors such as institutionalized power, and on economic factors such as the distribution of credit. Many thinkers on political economy (e.g., Ollman 1983) include esthetic, religious, and ethical life in a manner that is reminiscent of the anthropologist's culture. In most meanings of culture and political economy and their interaction, also, there is a concern with an aggregate whole

of production and distribution, both of cultural and physical life. But there are also many lacks of overlap or intersection between “culture” and “political economy,” as these terms are normally understood: culture as native world view, for instance, typically ignores the entanglements of the local system with the world economy, whereas political economy in the national or worldwide sense characteristically ignores the local meanings of values like “usury” and “honor” (e.g., as analyzed by Abu-Lughod [1986]); in fact, it usually ignores *all* local meanings.

To return to quantification, particularly ethnoquantification, these proposals should be irritating in a constructive, gadfly sense, and exploration is, in any sense, indispensable to ferreting out the dynamics within the constants of the system or structure. Aside from their extraordinary analytical significance and intrinsic interest, the twin issues of quantification and the unique individual (event, person) fall under the structural linguist’s category of *parole*. They also bear on the more general philosophical issue of determinacy and indeterminacy in all systems—linguistic, economic, poetic, technological.

Ideology

“Post-capitalism” has created a ghost world where unnatural meanings are the natural ones . . . man is a protagonist in a sort of grotesque “return to nature” in a completely false nature.

—Feruccio Rossi-Landi, *Linguistics and Economics*

Ideology, the second of our three variables, has been discussed, characterized, and identified in many ways. It is confusingly entangled in commonsense meanings, and in a host of semitechnical ones, notably in critiques of totalitarian thought, and in schools of Marxist thought (masterfully summarized in Larrain 1979).

Some of the identifications of ideology with other ideas and phenomena should at least be mentioned. First come the identifications of ideology with the following: (1) religion, (2) “secular religion,” (3) a theology like that of the Old Testament, (4) myth, and (5) anti-myth. In fact, ideology is closely interlaced with myth in senses that include, for example, the myth of Sisyphus and the myth of Napoleon, as well as systems and networks of symbols, ideas, images, and emotional values that resolve or bridge individual and cultural antitheses or that variously legitimate, validate, or hallow customary ways of doing things. Myth in these and other senses often informs ideological tactics and parallels ideological superstructures.

Second, ideology is often identified with (6) nationalism. Or it is identified with (7) culture in some colloquial sense, or (8) the anthropologist’s culture in any one of several meanings, such as when ideology is said to be the totality of the speakers’ commonsense reasonings about all meanings, and/or the language of such reasonings. A famous theorist defined ideology as a “general system of beliefs held in common by the members of a collectivity” (Parsons 1951:349). Just as inclusive is Gramsci’s idea that ideology is “a conception of the world that is implicitly manifest in art, law, in economic activity and in all manifestly individual and collective life” (1971[1929–35]:328). Finally, for the neo-Hegelian, ideology may be “any cognitive system that stems from the order of the logical idea” (Kristeva 1984:250). In these and yet other, often rather figurative meanings, something highly problematical, something to be clarified, is called something else that is at least as problematical and for which there already exist popular and/or social-scientific terms. Just because “everything” has an ideological aspect or angle does not make analytically useful or realistic a totalizing or totalitarian definition.

More serious are the relatively analytical concepts proposed by some persons engaged in the pros and cons of Marxism—for example, that ideology is what is left over after we subtract language, kinship, and economics. By one of these conceptualizations—paraphrasing Althusser (1972)—ideology is the pervasive system of apparatuses, such as the schools, by which the (bourgeois) state reproduces itself. And there is another one of

Gramsci's metaphors to the effect that ideology is "a terrain" for the struggle by one class for the generic hegemony of the political order over a second, more comprehensive order that is social in the sense, for example, of comprising the family and kinship (Gramsci 1983; Anderson 1977). Within his interesting framework, political hegemony is both a part of and a means to cultural hegemony. But calling an ideology a terrain is also misleadingly metaphorical, and reminds us of Machiavelli's (admittedly overstated) dictum about eschewing metaphors in political analysis. For one thing, the nuances of "terrain" reinforce the essentialist view (widespread in anthropology) that ideology is some sort of substance. The metaphor leads us to look in the wrong places.

I think we are left with three most valuable meanings of ideology, all of them natural in terms of at least some common, colloquial usage, and all consonant with a considerable body of scientific analysis. According to one of these, ideology is the basic notions or ideas that the members of a society hold about a fairly definite, if not bounded set or area such as honor, matrilineal affiliation, or the division of labor, and the interrelations and implications of such sets of notions. Ideology in this sense is the more ideational, intellectual, and conceptual constituent of culture—in contrast, for example, to observed or statistically measured patterns of behavior. Ideology in this first, notational sense has a considerable degree of coherence and direction, an agenda, and a validating, mythic aspect. This first meaning has been useful for many kinds of analysis, both empirical and theoretical, and will be alluded to intermittently below.

According to the second of the three meanings, ideology is a system, or at least an amalgam, of ideas, strategies, tactics, and practical symbols for promoting, perpetuating, or changing a social and cultural order; in brief, it is political ideas in action. The order may be specifically economic, political, religious, esthetic, or of yet other kinds, but the economic aspects, parts, or levels tend to be more important. Such sets of ideas for action arise from the engagement of creative individuals with practical problems and necessarily reflect or express the will and interests for control or change of some social group or class—notably, its economic interests. While such a group may be an elite, a privileged region, or a kinship line or dynasty (including metaphorical "dynasties"), it can just as well involve an underprivileged class or a professional group. Incidentally, two or more ideologies can always coexist within a single social system, since "context," from the present point of view, ranges in scope from the mind of one person to international sets and organizations.

As for the third meaning, there is a negative, usually rhetorical, self-righteous part that actually originated with Napoleon, who called ideology a misleading metaphysics as contrasted with "laws adapted to the heart and the lessons of history." This definition was picked up by political reactionaries and then adapted and rerouted by Marxists. But ideology, whether defined as idealistic mumbo-jumbo, or as "a protective cocoon woven by conservatives," or as a cocoon-squasher wrought by utopian revolutionaries, remains, in each, the other fellow's ideas, which are wrong-headed, illusory, or downright evil. Anti-Marxist Karl Mannheim, for example, claims that ideology "structurally resembles a lie" (1953:238). Or, following the so-called fundamentalist Marxist position, ideology is a tissue of rationalizations and false beliefs generated by the "coextensive economic base."

Given the problems entailed by these negative meanings, together with the real practical dangers (e.g., from totalitarian dictatorships), it is hardly surprising that major thinkers have tried to oppose ideology (or the very idea of ideology in science), or that they have argued that ideology would decline. They forget that ideology (or something very like it under a different name) is an inevitable component of *all* politics, including life within and between families (some political categorization of mutually differentiating values is an inevitable consequence of all social interaction). They forget the rising role of ideology in local and regional factionalism today, notably manifest in Third World countries. They also forget or gloss over the differences between the relatively colloquial and analytical meanings of the term and the so-called "total ideologies" of fascism and Stalin-style communism, which encompass and deliberately invade all aspects of life. Fi-

nally, they forget that the consistent tendency throughout history to conceptualize ideology in negative terms reflects the complex roles of ideology *in any sense* in maintaining or achieving asymmetrical and exploitative relations of power, that is, in distorting or obfuscating or constricting possible understandings, possible imaginings of the self, and dialogic and other human relations.

After the negative aspects of ideology have been qualified, clarified, or discarded, as the case may be, what remains is the analytically priceless, mainly Marxist notion of ideology as a set or at least amalgam of ideas, rationalizations, and interpretations that mask or gloss over a struggle to get or hold onto power, particularly economic power, with the result that the actors and ideologues are themselves largely unaware of what is going on. In this second, critical meaning, ideology arises from the interests of a class, usually an economic class or an economically defined class, and it is thus historically embedded, that is, is meaningful only in a partly historical sense (for example, Locke's "natural" pursuit of life, liberty, and the pursuit of property—the latter changed to the more ingenuous "happiness" by our Founding Fathers).

The main difference between the points of view that I call the pragmatic and the critical-Marxist is that the first emphasizes conscious action while obviously admitting unconscious forces, whereas the second emphasizes the control of or influence on action by largely unconscious or otherwise buried forces while obviously having to admit that even the worst ideologue has *some* conscious and explicit understanding of the sources of his position. Both types of ideology may blend in actuality: the Soviets' Russian-language policy has been, on the one hand, for some people, part of a cynical, racist exploitation of minorities, sometimes accompanied by punitive or preventive genocide when things go wrong (Barghoorn 1956). But the same ideology, at other times and from other angles, may be seen as a constructive program whereby the benevolent older (i.e., Russian) "brother" has brought the amenities of modern life to younger (e.g., Siberian, indigenous) brothers. Similar ambivalences run through the language policy of Americans and the American government vis-à-vis the Native American, which ranges from fascistic assimilationism and vengeful resentment to varying degrees of cordiality and empathy. While the two points of view on ideology have been characterized here in order to bring out their distinctiveness, they also are related systematically: the pragmatic ideology, for one thing, will to some extent be governed or determined by the critical (e.g., Marxist) level, whereas the critical ideology will to some extent be determined, circumvented, and so on by relatively self-conscious or sophisticated leaders and even publics.

Whether we take the pragmatic or the critical points of view of ideology, there remain a number of questions that are consonant with both. For example, what is the scope and force of elite consciousness, and how does it bear on political economy? How does ideology focus attention on the relation between language and politics (C. Friedrich 1963:84)? What sorts of phenomena mediate between language, ideology, and political economy, assuming, although it does seem problematic, that a model or logic of component parts and mediating parts is what we want? All this brings us to language, our third variable or theme for critique.

Language

But mimesis and poetic language . . . no longer act as instinctual floodgates within the enclosure of the sacred and become instead protesters against its posturing. And thus, its complexity unfolded by its practices, the signifying process joins the social revolution.

—Julia Kristeva, *Revolution in Poetic Language*

Let us put forward as a working definition that language is a verbal process by which the individual relates ideas and emotions to sound and other material symbolism in terms of a code and in the context of a society and its culture, and their respective, interrelated histories. That the code has a great number of potentially relevant linguistic levels—from

the minutely phonic to various kinds of vocabulary and syntactic patterning—has been shown, among others, by McQuown, who posits a total of 39 levels (1984). Or we can differentiate between the members of the familiar trilogy of syntax (roughly, word order), pragmatics (roughly, word use), and semantics; the latter includes, roughly, word meaning, but, more specifically, meaning in grammar and culturally linguistic meaning such as the political implications of a metaphor or a synecdoche (part-for-whole or whole-for-part relation). Or again, it may be useful to dichotomize between language in its texts and contexts as against grammar in a generic sense that includes both syntax and semantics. Elliptically put, codes always function in contexts, and all contexts have codes.

The idea of language as a network of continuous code variables and of continuous context variables has deep and analytically valuable consequences. Some of these emerge when we consider the pervasive analogies between economics and language (some would say homologies because, among other things, the systems have evolved together). What are some of these homologies, or points of articulation? The pairings that follow move from the concrete and particular to the more abstract and general, in each giving the linguistic-semantic term first and the political-economic one second: (1) speakers are to workers, as (2) messages are to commodities, as (3) speech is to variable capital, as (4) language is to capital; in other words, the exchange of messages in a speech is like the exchange of commodities in an economic community. But even by this point the crudeness of the analogies is apparent: for example, “workers” should be changed to “members of the economy”; messages—many of which are cheap—are not, in general, bought and exchanged like commodities; and language, usually defined as something shared and known by any native speaker, is very different from the capital of an individual or of the entire policy. Even less realistic, although original and suggestive, are the specific (and misplacedly concrete) analogies that have been drawn between a phonological or other linguistic structure and a specific economic structure (Lévi-Strauss 1969), or between signifying elements à la Saussure and exchange value à la Marx. But despite the unevenness or weakness of such analogies, the fact or at least the fruitful hypothesis remains that there are many similarities between economic and linguistic theory (e.g., Bourdieu 1977), and that economic elements and linguistic elements are often to some extent symbolic substitutes—like humans and some species of animal in the history of a tradition of sacrifice. A concrete and felicitous example of this is the monetary exchange-value of Wolof “griot” speech (“loud, high-pitched, rapid, verbose, florid, and emphatic,” with many phonological and other linguistic devices [Irvine 1989; see also Irvine 1975]), which ought to remind us that talk is often *not* cheap, particularly on prime time, or in the lawyer’s or doctor’s office, or any time when it is laced with ideology and bears seriously on the capital of an individual or a group. Or, returning to the original abstraction, the truer relations between economics and linguistics will continue to emerge if we think of the matter, not in terms of vague analogies but in terms of general, systemic ones, and very specific, analytical ones.

Our idea of the fruitful analogies between economics and linguistics, political economy and language, may be sharpened by inspecting their potential for criticizing pie-in-the-sky linguistic relativism or socially alienated formalisms. Such relativism and such formalisms have proven scientific value and they are both consonant with laudable, liberal (e.g., Lockean or Montaignean) principles of mutual tolerance. But they are also determined historically and by social class, and *may* be attached to exploitative and colonial ideologies (Rossi-Landi 1977:175): the native linguistic co-worker (“native informant”) and the underdeveloped native generally is “equal” because—if you’ll pardon the sarcasm—their languages (at least the phonologies) are of equal complexity à la Boas, and they are “free” to the extent that they can generate and sing poems and generate and utter an infinitude of syntactic strings even while the sociolinguist ignores their ideologies and political economies. The economic/linguistic analogies can also be sharpened by bringing them to bear on the problem of linguistic alienation, for example, how the individual must adjust to the dominant language or suffer communicative death. A full

exploration of linguistic alienation remains one of the most fundamental goals for a radical cultural linguistics (building, for example, on Wittgenstein and Rossi-Landi).

The foregoing problems of analogy would, in any case, be ignored by both the serious economist (who generally ignores language) and the serious linguist (who generally looks away from economics). We are left with a suggestive set of similarities between language and (political) economy, and, more particularly, between a more or less structuralist view of language and a more or less structuralist-Marxist view of (political) economy. Some of the meaning of such analogies is that the ruling elite, class, faction, or other power possesses control over the emission and circulation not only of machines and foods and arms, but of verbal and nonverbal messages. In other words, speakers tend to become alienated from the means of interpretation just as workers tend to become alienated from the means of production. Dominant powers control the messages and even the subcodes of advertising, including political advertising, of many or most of the channels of communication, and of most of the modalities of interpretation; certain messages and models of messages are reiterated ad infinitum whereas others are jammed; control over the form of messages goes hand-in-hand with control over their means of interpretation (which is usually pervasive and subliminal). Such control of messages was glaringly illustrated in the national media such as *Newsweek* by the treatment in the 1980s of the Midwestern farm crisis: touching "human interest" vignettes of foreclosed farm families were accompanied by total silence on the devastating role of agribusiness; during the presidential caucus of 1988 the crisis was described as "over" and the save-the-farm film, *Country*, was mocked—although farms were still being foreclosed, the average farmer's annual net income had sunk to one-seventeenth of his debts, and huge posters on Iowa's Highway 2 said, "Suicide Is Not The Answer." To a significant degree, then, political economy is a matter of competing for information and tropes in this comprehensive sense, and for the power to disseminate them and to misinform audiences, here the American reading public.

Many thinkers have argued the mediating role of language. Lukács and the Frankfurt School have shown the mediating role of art, particularly verbal art, and of science, particularly the social sciences (which consist, to a significant degree, of verbal skills). Karl Mannheim argued that between ideology and political economy there mediated a "style of thought," which, since style is part of the larger issue of language, leads into what is perhaps still the major problem of cultural linguistics: linguistic relativism, and, specifically, the hypothesis that the major effect or influence of language on thought (and ideology, etc.) is through the more poetic dimensions of its process, as when racially loaded formulae or the nuances of pronominal usage structure and influence the dialogues between leaders (P. Friedrich 1986:43–44; Urban 1986).

These points will become clear if we consider certain theorists as individual human beings embedded in the culture of their times. Mao's status as a theoretician is enigmatic, just as his status as a classical poet is problematic, and yet he was enough of both of these to make the intersection of the roles at least intriguing. And Marx, in precisely the passages where he fulminates against, or at least critiques, ideology and religion as illusion, falsification, and fetishism, is himself vulnerable to a close reading that would show that his thought was partly structured in terms of language-specific categories. Marx's thought was also emotionally driven by German language-and-culture literary values, notably those of the Romantic poetry to which he devoted some of the best years of his younger life and of which he published some 150 pages. Analogous texturings could be shown between the language and thought of Milton, Martin Luther, and Martin Luther King. We must apply to Thoreau and Camus, Marx and Bakhtin, Paine and Churchill, and any and all leaders in the Marxist, cryptomaxist, antimaxist, liberal, anarchist, reactionary, fascist, and other marketplaces, arenas, universes, and so forth, the same standards of historical, philological, and critical analysis that we do to anyone else—including ourselves. Camus (1976) in *The Myth of Sisyphus*, for example, while brilliantly

expounding an anarchic-existentialist humanism, uses “lucidity” 31 times over 102 pages in a way that demonstrates his deep affinities to the French rational tradition.

The forms, materials, and manifestations of language at all levels enter into figures of speech, or tropes. By trope I mean, as a sort of working definition, not only metaphor, but a much wider field that includes all constructions, usages, and uses that, by virtue of such things as image, juxtaposition, analogy, and mood, are novel, vivid, persuasive, or emotionally compelling in terms of the values of a particular language-and-culture (“linguacultural”) system. The creation of tropes is always uniquely individual, although most of the creators’ names are soon forgotten.

Tropes

I would introduce into Marx’s conceptual *framework* the idea of character *structure*. . . workers must be *viewed* not only as *prisoners* of their conditions, but as *prisoners* of themselves, of their own character *structures*, which are the *product* of previous conditions.

—Bertell Ollman, *Alienation* [emphasis added]

Let’s get down to some basics—to specific tropes and their role not only in economy, science, and art, but in the everyday palaver that linguists include under *parole* and to the emotional role in political economy that is played by tropes like synecdoche.

One trope is irony, in the initial generic sense that what is said is not what is meant. Irony can govern not just word selection, clause syntax, and other local matters but also entire creations, such as the poems of Heine, or entire cultural styles, such as Mexican Indian mishap humor. There are also cross-cultural ironic styles, such as Socratic irony and romantic irony (Shapiro 1988). In poetics there are, in fact, at least 18 kinds of carefully defined theory, including understatement, antiphrasis, ridicule, types of paradox, romantic irony, and four kinds of dramatic irony (e.g., Preminger 1974:407). As I suggested earlier, much Marxism is motivated by attitudes toward one kind of irony of fate: the contrast between the individual’s (mainly conscious) aspirations and what the society—by processes of which she or he is largely unaware—eventually makes of him or her. A much more special variant of irony is the deliberate obscurity, opacity, or crypticism—or just plain difficulty—so regnant in German philosophy, and also in French and then in Russian Symbolist poetry. Most social discourse, conversation, fiction, and poetry are significantly ironic because—putting the whole thing as abstractly as possible—irony engages affective-ethical contrasts and conflicts between factors in communication and exchange—actors and roles, for example—or, from another angle, contrasts between intention and realization. That’s one reason why some of the more original recent sociolinguistics has dealt with irony, whether or not couched explicitly in those terms (e.g., Tannen 1986). Unlike chiasmus or metaphor, which lend themselves to—perhaps even suggest—“purely formal analysis” through syntax and semantics, the patterns and uses of irony are so embedded in context, scene, drama, motivation, paradox, mendacity, idealism and disillusion, and social ambiguity that they positively encourage approaches that recognize and integrate all the dimensions of language that I have alluded to: the pragmatic, the grammatical, the cultural-semantic, and the external-economic. Irony, a cross-cultural and cross-linguistic universal (if there are any such), is possibly the most powerful trope and the one most frequently employed. We therefore need to give close attention to the manifold functions of the modal trope of irony as part of our evolving radical sociolinguistics and linguistic political economy.

Metonymy (e.g., Synecdoche)

Another type of trope is metonymy—in classical poetics, the use of a word or similar symbol in a new, associated meaning (for example, “The White House” for the president). Such trans-naming is based on or motivated by association, typically in space or

place but also in social context or even time, all of which, following Bühler (1934), can be comprehended by the term "contiguity." All language is metonymic to a large degree and, speaking metonymically, the relations of anatomy, part-for-whole, and other kinds of contiguity are of enormous scope. In conversations and similar discourse, metonymy is omnipresent, usually in surface frequencies, always as a potential. At the other extreme, poetry, great and small, is often diagnostically marked by metonymy and by the specific subtype called "synecdoche," which consists of whole-for-part or part-for-whole relations. Metonymy may be characteristic of particular poets, such as Alexander Pushkin, or of poetic traditions, such as French Neoclassical poetry, or of entire areas of shared linguistic-poetic intuition, such as many Native American oral traditions (Kroeber 1983). It is also characteristic of much non-Native American advertising: "The Beer That Made Milwaukee Famous," "Brewed with Water from When the Earth Was Pure," and "From the Land of the Grizzly," are all synecdochic, although they shade by various associations into metaphor and other figures (e.g., from grizzly to the Rockies to cold to the drops on a beer can, and so forth). Multifarious indeed are the roles of synecdoche in terms of paradigms, frequencies, and geometrical symmetries and asymmetries, as formalist poetics has shown. And the terrible power of synecdoche surfaces from its workings in the political economy when allegorical individuals ("The Jap," "The Hun," "The Jew") or an entire population ("The Americans," "The Germans," "The Russians"), frozen in the formulae of conversations, are accused of atrocities or mass crimes in which only a fraction, sometimes a small fraction, of the population was engaged and which the majority or a significant minority may have actively or passively opposed. The name of an entire group, culture, or nation, by such tropic falsification, is misused to refer to the actions of an often small subset. There is in fact a sort of synecdochic continuum ranging from one "representative" individual to the literal totality of the group in question.

The primordial processes of synecdochic replacement—whether reductionist (scapegoating) or expansionist (collective guilt)—work synergistically with the emotions: they are hard to resist when we see a photo of a trooper in Group A killing, beating, or tormenting a woman of Group B. The processes in question increase their power when the information, described by the same formulae, is transmitted by the mass media with all their exponential quantities, subliminal influencing, and the capacity to enter the life of the home. In these terms, synecdoche can constitute catalyzing formulae, the sheer and surface forms that suggest, trigger, or catalyze feelings that in their turn and together with the legitimating ideologies, can change and even revolutionize or decimate the (political) economy—how? through ethnic discrimination, the wholesale seizure or even destruction of property, violence to creditors, real or imagined, the saturation bombing of villages and suburbs, or all-inclusive genocide. I would suggest that, of all the tropes, synecdoche and related forms of metonymy are the most relevant and insidious when it comes to conflict between ethnic, racial, class, and other social and political groups.

Linguacultural Ideology

What I have said so far indicates that to these three ideas of ideology as a subset of cultural notions, a compensatory rationalization, or a political pragmatics, a fourth should be added.

The additional assumption that I now want to introduce is that the many sounds and meanings of what we conventionally call "language" and "culture" constitute a single universe of its own kind, the parts of which are bound at least as much to each other as to anything else outside that universe. It is one universe not only in terms of analysis but also in terms of the point of view that is implied by the discourse and actions of the participants. I am talking about a domain of experience that fuses and intermingles the vocabulary, many semantic aspects of grammar, and the verbal aspects of culture; both grammar and culture have underlying structure while they are constantly being used and constructed by actual people on the ground. I will refer to this unitary but, at other levels,

internally differentiated domain or whole as “linguaculture,” or, concretely, Greek linguaculture, rural southern Vermont linguaculture, and so on. One reason for thus neologizing is to help get rid of the decades-long balancing act between “language *and* culture” (“how much of each?”), “language *in* culture” (“culture in language?”), and to recognize that the real world and much of our ongoing research involve a common ground that is shared by both the phenomena in question, and that that common ground is usually more important than what is not shared.

The linguacultural order, like language itself, is constituted by the interaction between and the integration along many variables, which should usually be seen as continuous. The linguacultural order has ethical, political, and other implications that variously jell, organize, and even motivate individuals and groups of individuals. Such linguacultural ideology includes, for example, sexism, that is, male dominance, and other nuances of gender that are built into the vocabulary and even the grammar of English and most other languages. These language factors feed into “sexual politics” and the various patriotisms and chauvinisms that are woven into conventional figures of speech about national politics.

Linguacultural ideology touches on everything from grassroots technology and folk metaphysics to the philosopher’s metaphysics. Linguacultural ideology, to put it aphoristically (perhaps too aphoristically) is not about how our ideas of language are determined or at least defined by cultural values, but rather how the complementary processes by which the values implicit in a language determine, define, and affect the culture, particularly its political economic dimensions. Linguacultural ideology draws on and is generated by most levels and compartments of language proper (including the obligatory and “purely” phonological and syntactic rules—which yield the shibboleths that can cost you your head). Linguacultural ideology includes some projections from axioms, but these are unevenly distributed, typically irregular, and only part of how the system works: language is only to some extent like a geometrical system. In fact, linguacultural ideology—like a language in general, in what makes it different from other languages—is at least as much a matter of dyadic and other small sets of minor and shallow rules, and of specific associations that, for example, link green and Islam, and link “red” (*krasnyj*) and “beautiful” (*pre-krasnyj*) in Russian thought to this day. Linguacultural ideology draws on and is generated by those parts of language that are relatively susceptible to linguistic elaboration—through punning and word play, for example—and to workings of tropes. Linguacultural ideology draws on the less behavioral and less material aspects of culture. Linguacultural ideology directly affects the other two kinds of ideology emphasized here, of which it is, indeed, an organic part (e.g., politicians, in particular, exploit the racism and sexism that is implicit in grammar, because it is assumed within hegemonic linguacultural ideology).

Linguacultural ideology is not, I think, coordinate with the three other kinds of ideology discussed above in this section. On the one hand, it is more diffuse, pervasive, and comprehensive than the pragmatic and critical kinds, but less so than notional ideology. On the other hand, it is more located in the unconscious or subconscious of the speaker and speaker collectivities than any of the other three kinds of ideology: notional, pragmatic, or critical. Reflecting this categorically, epistemologically different order, linguacultural ideology in its conceptualization is also less colloquial and more technical and, as it were, linguistic-anthropological than any of the other three kinds of ideology. All four kinds of ideology, of course, overlap with each other to some extent.²

Language, finally, while often derivative or mainly personally expressive, is also a masterfully powerful variable that must be treated as partly independent of anything else and, I would add, coordinate with ideology and political economy. But let’s turn to a final theoretical issue.

Alternatives and Complements

That universal reason, practical or ethical, that determinism, those categories that explain everything are enough to make a decent man laugh.

—Albert Camus, *The Myth of Sisyphus*

My concern is with prior theory that is economically oriented, socially relevant, and language-sophisticated theory. But a large theoretical totality always contains or implies alternative logics or symbolisms, and theory and the theorist will be strong to the degree that such alternatives are entertained. The field of inquiry would do well to engage a larger body of theory that may be neither radically socially critical nor economically oriented (for example, the work of Edward Sapir or Jacques Derrida [1976]), or that is not radically socially critical (the work of A. N. Whitehead and C. S. Peirce come to mind), or that is not saliently economical (Albert Camus and Friedrich Nietzsche would illustrate this), or that is both radically critical and economically oriented and yet, like the first three types, is usually seen as outside the perimeter of these two orientations (the anarchists Michael Bakunin and Henry David Thoreau [e.g., Gura 1981] deserve close study). Similar points could be made about the potential complementary role of Kristeva (1984) and Luxemburg (1961; see also Lukács 1985), both of whom are, be it noted, more directly Hegelian than the eight named above. The ideas of such thinkers can serve as an invaluable counter or a necessarily substituted component to whatever we glean from the more obvious schemes of Bakhtin, Chomsky, and Williams (1976, 1977) and the others. And one need only mention Rousseau and Hegel to be reminded of *their* seminal and enduring role in almost any radical theory, whether political, economic, existential, phenomenological, or something as far off (and yet theoretically relevant) as American Zen. Even a single utterance by these and other strong, originating figures may exercise a powerful and subtle (“sub-textual”) force in the history of radical critical thought; think, for example, of Hegel’s “All work is inhibited/constrained desire.”

Beyond the more obvious sources in linguistic, anthropological, sociological, political science, philosophical, and critical-Marxist theory, there also exist more distant ideas that need to be recognized and used in all their richness. These alternative, complementary, and/or marginal ideas can be found in, for example, deconstructionist literary criticism and neoclassical economics and, in the American tradition, in the words of Paine, Emerson, Thoreau, Peirce, Veblen, Dewey, and Burke, to name but a few. The almost diagnostic theoretical eclecticism of practically all American thinkers may be fruitfully synthesized with the de facto multiplicity of the more or less Marxist orientations today, and may also be variously integrated with such relevant adjacent fields of inquiry as economic anthropology, classical political theory, and structuralist, post-structuralist (including deconstructionist) linguistics and poetics. We are part, then, of a continuously fluctuating growth of intellectual history in which all theory, including our own small enterprises, has complex and numerous sources with complex and numerous implications for the future. The goal is to draw freely on the existing reservoir of theories without concern for hegemonic boundaries or the dictates of dogma or doctrine.

Conclusions

... if the bourgeois vulgate enshrines culture in this transcendence of values and consciousness precisely in order to exalt it as *culture*, the Marxist vulgate embalms it in the very same transcendence in order to denounce it as *ideology*. . . ; the two scriptures rejoin in the same magical thinking.

—Jean Baudrillard, *For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign*

I have sketched two sharply different but fundamentally complementary approaches to language, ideology, and political economy, namely, the analytic-scientific approach and the emotional-ethical approach. Salient problems for the study of political economy include (1) working in terms of large and open-boundaried wholes; (2) quantification—including ethno-quantification and positivistic quantification—and its role in systems-

in-process, particularly economic and political uses; (3) the role of the unique, inventive individual in the “real world”; and (4) analyzing the three interdependent universes in question. After naming about a dozen meanings of “ideology,” such as equating it with myth or “an arena of politics,” I emphasized two fruitful meanings: (1) the pragmatic, that is, relatively conscious tactics and concepts for action, particularly political action, and (2) the critical (especially the critical Marxist), that is, a tissue of ideas that mask underlying political economic realities. The idea of notional ideology has also proven itself. I next described language as a universe of continuous interacting variables without sharp lines between them; for example, syntax, cultural semantics, and forms-in-use. The structure of a linguistic theory in this sense is complexly analogous to that of a radical political economic theory. Language is related to ideology and political economy in many ways, often through the workings of tropes such as irony or synecdoche, as realized, repeated, and recreated in the ongoing, on-the-ground, partly ad hoc synthesis and practice of flesh-and-blood individuals in business meetings, poetry readings, kitchen parties, tête-à-tête conversations—whatever. The main discussion ends with a sketch of “lingua-cultural ideology” and its implications.

One reason for the complexity of my position is the multifariously synergistic relation, not only among our three main variables of language, ideology, and political economy, but also, severally, between the latter two of these and the useful trichotomy between grammatical structures, systems of language use, and cultural semantics, and then, illustrative of these latter two, the many types of politically explosive figures of speech such as synecdoche and irony. And yet all of these cross-cut, in turn, the fundamental terms in the continuous relation between theoretical and practical reason. No matter how critical we may be of the misuse and reification of this latter contrast, the fact remains that it permeates our Western, Judeo-Christian theory (and Oriental philosophy too) and cross-cuts the three basic variables being dealt with in this article: in the split between grammar and language-in-use, for instance, or in the split between ideology-as-falsifying rationalization and ideology-as-tactics, or in the split between the abstract dynamics of the political economy as against the economic meanings created by individuals “on the ground.” All the dimensions just alluded to then intersect variously with the fundamental, partly heuristic dichotomy with which I began: the analytic-scientific and the emotional-ethical. This dichotomy cannot be reduced or transformed to the more familiar “scientific” versus “humanistic.” Brilliant scientific analysis—Marx on English capitalism or Lenin on Russian capitalism, for example, or Veblen and Mills on American elites, or Haugen and Fishman on Norwegian and Yiddish in America—are often contextualized in humanistic or philosophical sophistication (which all six of these men decidedly had!) and are rooted in a humanistic or at least thoroughly human sense of social criticism or outrage or compassion or advocacy or concern.

Notes

Acknowledgments. For their critical comments on various versions of this article I stand indebted to John Attinasi, Burt Bledstein, James Collins, John Comaroff, Deborah Friedrich, William Hanks, Mark Krupnik, John Leavitt, Hy van Luong, Bruce Mannheim, and Ed Wilmsen. Spencer Levy provided a research nugget in a term paper. The original version was presented as part of the 1986 American Anthropological Association annual meeting panel “Language and Political Economy,” organized by James Collins and Hy van Luong (to whom I am grateful for including me).

¹As regards the basis of the emotional-ethical approach, and adapting Baxandall (Bottomore 1983:286): a sense of outrage at (1) degradation and exploitation, (2) injustice and inhumanity, and (3) the warping of potentials for self-realization, *in its status as a central feature*, is what distinguishes Marxism from other major philosophies, although this must be corrected to include, for example, anarcho-syndicalism and many varieties of Christianity and Buddhism.

²For alternative conceptualizations of the language/ideology issue see Kristeva (1984) and the interpretation by Burniston and Weedon (1980); Silverstein (1979) and Fishman (1985) both build, albeit in different ways, on Whorf's essays (1964).

References Cited

- Abu-Lughod, Lila
1986 *Veiled Sentiments: Honor and Poetry in a Bedouin Society*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Althusser, Louis
1972[1971] *Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses, and Lenin before Hegel*. In *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays*. Ben Brewster, transl. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Anderson, P.
1977 *The Antinomies of Gramsci*. *New Left Review* 100:5–80.
- Barghoorn, Frederick C.
1956 *Soviet Russian Nationalism*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Beeman, William O.
1986 *Language, Status, and Power in Iran*. Bloomington: University of Indiana Press.
- Bottomore, Tom, et al., eds.
1983 *A Dictionary of Marxist Thought*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Bourdieu, Pierre
1977 *The Economics of Linguistic Exchange*. *Social Science Information* 16(6):645–666.
1985[1972] *Outline of a Theory of Practice*. Richard Nice, transl. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bühler, Karl
1934 *Sprachtheorie*. Jena: Fisher Verlag.
- Burniston, Steve, and Chris Weedon
1980 *Ideology, Subjectivity, and the Artistic Text*. In *On Ideology*. Stuart Hall et al., eds. Pp. 199–230. London: Hutchinson.
- Camus, Albert
1976[1942] *The Myth of Sisyphus and Other Essays*. Justin O'Brien, transl. New York: Vintage Books.
- Derrida, Jacques
1976[1967] *Of Grammatology*. G. C. Spivak, transl. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Errington, Joseph
1985 *On the Nature of the Sociolinguistic Sign: Describing the Javanese Speech Levels*. In *Semiotic Mediation*. Elizabeth Mertz and Richard Parmentier, eds. Pp. 287–310. New York: Academic.
- Firth, Raymond
1975[1965] *Primitive Polynesian Economy*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Fishman, Joshua A.
1985 *The Rise and Fall of the Ethnic Revival: Perspectives on Language and Ethnicity*. Berlin: Mouton.
- Friedrich, Carl J.
1963 *Man and his Government: An Empirical Theory of Politics*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Friedrich, Paul
1977[1970] *Agrarian Revolt in a Mexican Village*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
1986 *The Language Parallax*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
1987 *The Princes of Naranja*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Gramsci, Antonio
1971 [1929–35] *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, eds. London: Lawrence and Wishart.
1983[1957] *The Modern Prince and Other Writings*. Louis Marks, transl. New York: International Publishers.
- Gura, Philip F.
1981 *The Wisdom of Words: Language, Theology, and Literature in New England Renaissance*. Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press.
- Irvine, Judith
1975 *Wolof Speech Styles and Social Status*. *Working Papers in Sociolinguistics* 23. Austin, TX: Southwest Education Laboratory.
1989 *When Talk Isn't Cheap: Language and Political Economy*. *American Ethnologist* 16(2). (In press.)

- Kluckhohn, Clyde, and William H. Kelley
1945 The Concept of Culture. *In* *The Science of Man in the World Crisis*. Ralph Linton, ed. Pp. 78–107. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Kristeva, Julia
1984[1974] *Revolution in Poetic Language*. Margaret Waller, transl. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Kroeber, Karl
1983 *The Wolf Comes: Indian Poetry and Linguistic Criticism*. *In* *Smoothing the Ground: Essays in Native American Oral Literature*. Brian Swann, ed. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Labov, William
1972[1963] On the Mechanism of Linguistic Change. *In* *Sociolinguistic Patterns*. Pp. 160–183. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Larrain, Jorge
1979 *The Concept of Ideology*. Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press.
- Lévi-Strauss, Claude
1969[1949] *Elementary Structures of Kinship*. James H. Bell and John R. Sturmer, eds. R. Needham, transl. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Lukács, Georg
1985[1968] *History and Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics*. Rodney Livingstone, transl. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Luong, Hy van
1988 *Discourse and Counter-discourse: Person-referring Forms and Sociopolitical Struggles in Colonial Vietnam*. Paper presented at the 87th annual meetings of the American Anthropological Association, Phoenix.
- Luxemburg, Rosa
1961[1922] *The Russian Revolution*. Bertram D. Wolfe, transl. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Mannheim, Bruce
1989 *The Language of the Inka since the European Invasion*. Austin: University of Texas Press. (In press.)
- Mannheim, Karl
1953[1929] *Ideology and Utopia*. Louis Wirth and Edward Shils, transl. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
- Marx, Karl
1976[1867] *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy*. Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling, transls. New York: Modern Library.
- McQuown, Norman
1984 *El Lenguaje en la Cultura y en la Sociedad y en la Personalidad*. *Cuadernos de Estudios Lingüísticos* 6:95–110.
- Mintz, Sidney
1974 *Worker in the Cane: A Puerto Rican Life History*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Nash, June
1985[1970] *In the Eyes of the Ancestors: Belief and Behavior in a Mayan Community*. Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland.
- Ollman, Bertell
1983[1971] *Alienation: Marx's Conception of Man in Capitalist Society*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Parsons, Talcott
1951 *The Social System*. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.
- Paulston, Christina Bratt
1984 *Pronouns of Address in Swedish: Social Class Semantics and a Changing System*. *In* *Language Use: Readings in Sociolinguistics*. John Baugh and Joel Sherzer, eds. Pp. 268–292. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- Preminger, Alex, et al.
1974 *Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Redfield, Robert
1955 *The Little Community*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

- Rossi-Landi, Ferruccio
1977 *Linguistics and Economics*. The Hague: Mouton (Janua Linguarum: series maior, 81).
- Samuelson, P. A., and W. Nordham
1985 *Economics*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Shapiro, Marianne
1988 Irony. *In* *Figuration in Verbal Art*. Michael Shapiro and Marianne Shapiro, eds. Pp. 3–23. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Silverstein, Michael
1979 Language Structure and Linguistic Ideology. *In* *The Elements: A Parasession on Linguistic Units and Levels*. Paul R. Clyne, William Hanks, and Carol Hofbauer, eds. Pp. 193–248. Chicago: Chicago Linguistic Society.
- Tannen, Deborah
1986 *That's Not What I Meant*. New York: William Morrow.
- Tax, Sol
1953 *Penny Capitalism: A Guatemalan Indian Economy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Urban, Greg
1986 *Rhetoric of a War Chief*. Working Papers and Proceedings of the Center for Psychosocial Studies No. 5. Chicago: Center for Psychosocial Studies.
- Voloshinov, V. N.
1973 *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language*. Ladislav Malejka and I. R. Titunik, trans. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Whorf, Benjamin L.
1964 *Language, Thought and Reality: Selected Writings of Benjamin Lee Whorf*. John B. Carroll, ed. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Williams, Raymond
1976 *Keywords*. New York: Oxford University Press.
1977 *Marxism and Literature*. New York: Oxford University Press.